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There are many ways to organise transactions in a modern market economy. Beside the polar 
cases of spot markets on the one hand, in which trading activities are coordinated through the 
price mechanism, and integrated firms on the other hand, in which the allocation of resources 
and the coordination of decisions depend in last resort on a hierarchical structure, many 
different types of arrangements have developed, from long term bilateral contracts to 
franchise systems and networks of tightly interwoven firms. These non-standard forms likely 
represent the usual way of doing business, although they deviate from the usual representation 
of microeconomic textbooks in which there are firms, i.e., ‘producers’ processing goods and 
services through a production function, and ‘markets’, i.e., places in which producers and 
consumers proceed to exchanges.  
In what follows I concentrate on forms that involve multiple partners pooling some 
strategic decision rights and even some property rights while keeping distinct ownership over 
key assets, so that they require specific governance to monitor and discipline their 
interactions. I identify these arrangements as ‘hybrid organisations’, in line with the 
terminology proposed by Oliver Williamson (1996).1 In the second section I go farther in 
identifying and delineating these arrangements. The third section discusses the forces at work 
that may explain why parties accept to share strategic rights. The fourth section exhibits 
different mechanisms of coordination that may play distinctly or in combination. The fifth 
section suggests a typology of hybrid organisations based on the prevalence of each different 
mechanism. The final section concludes by emphasising problems raised by the very 
existence of hybrids, particularly with respect to competition policies. 
 What are hybrids? 
Although there is an abundant empirical literature describing the many different forms that the 
organisation of transactions can take, from strategic alliances involving several partners to 
network of firms tightly coordinated to franchise systems, the terminology fluctuates, making 
it difficult to capture exactly what is at stake. These variations in the vocabulary reflect the 
richness of arrangements to be considered as well as the lack of a unifying theory that could 
properly identify the nature of these arrangements and the logic underlying their diversity. 
To fix ideas about what can be assembled under the term ‘hybrid organisations’, let me 
start with a stylised fact.2 In the late 1970s, French millers were confronted by a sharp decline 
in the consumption of bread, particularly the famous ‘baguette’, and this decline exacerbated 
competition among them. A group of millers decided to react by establishing a niche of high 
quality products. To do so, they created a brand name to signal these products, with a strict 
list of requirements regarding the quality of flour to be used, the conditions under which it 
should be transformed and commercialised, etc. Marketing the product also required 
contracting with thousands of bakers who would commit to follow strict rules (e.g., using only 
the high quality flour delivered by these millers, never selling products that have been frozen, 
etc.). The millers established a joint entity, with each miller represented on the board of 
directors, to define the requirements, to develop new products (e.g., mixing different cereals), 
to market the brand, and to control quality and prevent free-riding. However, disciplining 
parties remained a major issue. To make control more efficient, the millers implemented a 
private court, delegating to three of them the power to investigate cases in which one party or 
the other would have cheated and to penalise the free riders, up to the point where one could 
be excluded from the network. So we have an arrangement in which parties are sharing some 
major decision rights and some property rights (e.g. over the brand name, over the 
investments required by the joint venture), while remaining legally and economically 
 autonomous. Indeed, the millers are also competitors: for example, eight of them are 
competing to attract well-located bakers for selling their products in metropolitan Paris.  
Of course this is not a unique example, although it has its own specificity. Strategic 
alliances in the airline industry, groups of producers committing to deliver high-quality 
products in the agri-food industry, partners creating joint ventures for R&D projects in high-
tech industries, etc., are confronted with similar problems and find solutions in implementing 
modes of governance that differ markedly from those implemented in integrated firms while 
not primarily relying on market prices.  
We can generalise the underlying logic of these ‘facts’ as follows. Assume three players, 
A, B, and C. Let SA, SB, and SC be vectors of the respective specific assets they hold, let dA, dB, 
and dC be the vectors of their respective decision rights, and πA, πB, and πC be the payoffs 
associated with their respective property rights. Now, assume these parties pool specific 
investments shA, siB, and sjC and decision rights dhA, diB, and djC, these joint activities 
generating a joint payoff π′A,B,C, the allocation of which is not fully contractible ex ante. 
Forms of governance must then be implemented to monitor joint decisions and sharing rules, 
with rights that are pooled and uncertainties in the allocation of payoffs determining the 
choice of means of coordination and control that shape these forms.  
There is indeed a large variety of possible combinations of the three dimensions identified 
above. Empirically, it is the presence or absence of a specific coordinating entity – call it a 
‘strategic centre’ – and the extension of its authority when it exists that seems to differentiate 
arrangements on the wide spectrum of hybrid modes of organisation (I come back to what 
determines these choices below). To illustrate, subcontracting or supplier parks usually 
depend on a leading firm that operates as a ‘buyer’ imposing specification on goods or 
services, although the ‘leader’ may also hold some decision rights and even property rights on 
its partners. Franchise systems or joint ventures markedly differ in that they unambiguously 
 rely on a coordinating centre, whether this centre gets its decision rights through delegation 
(joint ventures) or imposes its rules on participating partners (franchise). There are also the 
various forms taken by strategic alliances, supply chain systems networks, etc., which may 
restrict coordination to identifiable persons in charge of monitoring the agreement or may 
create bureaus or autonomous entities to control parties to the arrangement more or less 
tightly, as illustrated by the millers’ case.  
Notwithstanding their diversity, these forms qualify as hybrids in that they differ markedly 
from markets as well as from hierarchies. To simplify, using the notation above in the context 
of two parties, if we identify SE as a strategic entity that coordinates partners, we can 
characterise ‘ideal types’ (in a Weberian sense) as follows: 
 
Why do parties delegate or even abandon part of their rights? 
Given the above characterisation, why do holders of property and decision rights who could 
transact through markets renounce to significant rights in deciding to pool resources? From a 
certain point of view, this question has similarities with that of why employees transfer their 
decision rights to employers (Coase, 1937; Cheung, 1983). However, there is an important 
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 difference: in hybrid arrangements legally distinct entities also share some specific assets and 
property rights. Why do they engage in activities that seriously weaken their residual rights 
(so much so that finding an adequate sharing rule is a key issue, and often a source of 
instability in hybrids)? Three leading factors seem to be at work. 
First, parties may accept to share rights in order to face complexity.3 Complexity has two 
dimensions. It may result from the need to coordinate multiple interwoven transactions; or it 
may be due to a changing environment. In both cases, cooperation that involves the 
abandonment or delegation of some rights may prevail in order to overcome the resulting 
uncertainties or to develop an adequate buffer. For example, the tight networks developed by 
general contractors and their subcontractors in the construction industry are determined by the 
specificity of each project and the highly variable demand, both dimensions generating 
uncertainties that make adaptability among parties a key issue. More generally, unstable or 
unpredictable demand; technological changes; potential variations in the quality of inputs; 
risks of opportunistic behaviour; and unsecured institutional environments are all factors that 
might push partners to choose hybrid forms, mitigating uncertainty through buffer strategies, 
shared knowledge, common standards, and joint governance. 
Second, parties may view mutual dependence as a source of value, notwithstanding the 
fact that they often remain competitors, as strategic alliances in the airline industry illustrates. 
Several factors can motivate firms to endorse mutual dependence in holding pooled assets. 
The size of investments required may exceed their individual capacity, and/or economies of 
scale may be expected, as in many R&D projects. Complementarity may offer strategic 
responses to resource dependence, securing access to existing resources or facilitating access 
to new ones. Learning effects might also be anticipated, each firm becoming a portfolio of 
skills that networking allows to transfer and recombine more efficiently. Also, joint 
investments may help building a reputation with an expected snowball effect on revenues. 
 Third, payoff expected from interaction among parties may not be contractible ex ante, 
with specific contributions difficult to assess, so that partners look for organisational solutions 
that facilitate ex post negotiations to share rents with the lowest possible transaction costs. 
Indeed, because standard incentive contracts would perform poorly and measurement 
problems may be at stake, defining rules that allows a satisfactory split of the gains is not 
trivial. Some hybrid forms seem to have found relatively standardised solutions to the 
implementation of adequate sharing rules, as in franchise systems. However, many other 
forms rely on ex post negotiations and on noncontractible rules such as fairness or ‘perceived 
equity.’ Unfortunately and notwithstanding recent developments in experimental economics, 
we still know little about how such rules work effectively. 
Governance mechanisms 
What is clear, though, is that hybrid arrangements need monitoring. This is so because of high 
risks of opportunistic behaviour and free riding, which is the dark side of the forces pushing 
towards cooperation. Hence selecting the right partners, building trust through relational ties, 
and developing credible threat in case of misbehaviour might impose specific mechanisms of 
governance. Indeed, there is a continuing tension between the search for stability and the 
pressure coming from opportunistic temptations. In that respect, different devices can be 
implemented, with varying degree of authority over partners who can always exit.  
At the loose end of the authority spectrum, information systems such as integrated 
logistics, joint buying procedures, shared transportation facilities, etc. offer the possibility to 
reduce information asymmetries among partners, reducing risks of opportunism and 
facilitating mutual control. They also provide means for shaping the interface with the 
environment through the implementation of shared routines, standards facilitating 
communication, devices allowing conversion, and translation of protocols at low cost. 
Although information technologies play an important role in that respect, numerous studies 
 also show the significance of informal relationships such as social ties in building and sharing 
appropriate information that contributes to organising and consolidating hybrid 
arrangements.4 
The existence of formal contracts represents a step forward in tightening coordination. As 
emphasised by Macaulay (1963), contracts mainly provide a framework, a blueprint 
facilitating decisions and orienting joint actions. In doing so, contracts help delineate a stable 
environment within which partners can plan collaboration, set reciprocal expectations, and 
reduce misunderstandings and costly missteps. At the same time, contracts suffer the 
limitations of blueprints, leaving most decisions on tasks and process aside and often opening 
the way to adjustments through legally unenforceable clauses (e.g., arbitration provisions 
waiving rights to bring disputes before the courts).5 
However, most hybrids are not composed solely of independent entrepreneurs operating 
an outside structure governed solely by formal contracts. Other devices complement and 
interfere. One is the possibility of exogenous regulators initiating, implementing and 
eventually monitoring coordination among partners. In many cases, public authorities provide 
the backbone to hybrid arrangements, either directly through bureaus or agencies, as 
illustrated by the Galileo project, a global satellite navigation system developed by a network 
of firms at the initiative of the European Commission to compete with the GPS system; or 
indirectly, as when public authorities provide subsidies and other incentives conditional to 
cooperation among the benefactors (e.g., the so-called technology parks). However, such 
exogenous monitoring often mixes public and private interests. A good example is provided 
by the French certifying organisations, in which representatives of the government, producers, 
consumers, and distributors define standards and allocate rights associated with the 
identification of networks delivering high quality products (the successful ‘red label’ system). 
 Last, but not least, hybrids often coordinate through a formal body that operates as 
depository of authority for monitoring their joint actions. The simplest case is that of joint 
ventures, in which parent companies monitor their ‘child’ through a Board of Administration 
that they control. More complex forms also develop in which a strategic centre might operate 
along rules that exceed the power of individual partners to control joint activities, as 
illustrated by the example of the millers. A governing body with rules of its own can be 
implemented in charge of defining collective actions and joint strategies, designing 
enforcement mechanisms and implementing rules. Such entities can take different forms, e.g., 
co-owners assemblies (as in the condominium model), delegates composing an autonomous 
board, or a specific permanent entity. All of these arrangements involve centralisation of key 
decisions, a non-negligible level of formal rules, and partial control over property rights. 
A typology of hybrid arrangements  
These different mechanisms of governance suggest a trade-off among hybrid arrangements, 
from forms that involve loose coordination, with separation of decision rights and property 
rights among partners, to forms that impose very tight control, with strictly monitored shared 
rights. The variety of franchise systems illustrates this spectrum well.  
On the one hand, the richness of observable arrangements may suggest a continuum of 
hybrid forms spread between spot markets and the command-and-control hierarchical firm. At 
the same time, forms such as strategic alliances differ from franchises or joint ventures. To 
capture this intuition, one possibility is to hypothesise the existence of discrete structural 
forms that could relate to the characteristics identified so far. The underlying model could be 
synthesised as in Figure 1: 
[Figure 1 about here] 
 More explicitly, the degree of transfer of property rights and decision rights should 
translate into the need for coordinating devices that imply different costs of governance, 
determining different types of hybrids. Specifically: (1) the more concentrated are property 
rights over relationship-specific assets, the easier it is to coordinate, although at higher costs 
of governance; (2) the more concentrated are joint decision rights, the tighter the coordination 
involved, but also the more costly the associated governance mechanism; and (3) the more 
centralised is control over residual gains, the easier it is to coordinate, but this also pushes 
costs upwards. 
Using a deeply revised version of a representation provided by Williamson (1996 [1991]), 
I would then suggest that hybrid forms tend to crystallise around four typical arrangements, 
determined by their dominant governance mechanism (which does not preclude the presence 
of elements of the other mechanisms). Figure 2 illustrates these arrangements. 
[Figure 2 about here] 
If we assume that partners to hybrid arrangements target the maximisation of the expected 
value of their joint activities while minimising the associated costs of governance, then they 
will want to make a trade-off that keep them on the inferior frontier of the cost curve 
associated with the different governance mechanisms they can select.  
Problems raised by hybrid arrangements 
In all modern market economies, hybrid modes of organisation proliferate because the 
advantages of cooperation and coordination often overcome the gains associated to market 
competition, while the capacity for partners to maintain their autonomy of decision and their 
control over the core of their residual rights provides more flexibility and better incentives 
than what to expect from an integrated structure. However, the very nature of these 
arrangements blurs the frontiers of the firm as well as it challenges the standard representation 
 of markets. Unfortunately theories encompassing the nature and variety of these arrangements 
remain remarkably poor. Moreover, we still miss adequate data for estimating precisely the 
weight and dynamics of these forms, even for a form as well defined and extensively studied 
as franchising. We also need to understand better why in so many sectors hybrids co-exist 
with integrated firms, apparently without one prevailing over the other even in the long run. 
Another issue has to do with the role institutional environments, e.g., rules governing property 
rights, may play in that coexistence as well as in the comparative degree of development of 
hybrid arrangements and of specific forms of hybrids. Last but not least, hybrids almost 
always involve vertical as well as horizontal restrictions, which seriously challenge standard 
competition policies still largely built around the trade-off between markets and hierarchies. 
In-depth revision of these policies is therefore likely to be needed in the near future. 
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Figure 2: Hybrids and Governance Costs 
 
Notes 
                                                 
1
  This terminology is convenient in that it embeds hybrid types of organizational arrangements in a 
well defined framework, as argued below. It also has its drawbacks in suggesting that these forms 
could be interpreted as a simple mixture of ingredients coming from the pure forms that are 
markets and hierarchies, although the biological connotation of the term should clearly indicates 
that specific process and forms are at stake in hybrids. 
2
  This case is extensively described in Raynaud (1997) 
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3
  This was the argument already developed by Simon (1951) to explain the employment contract. 
4
  Greif (1993) provides a nice example of how a network can depend on informal information 
channels in a particularly challenging institutional environment. 
5
  Ryall and Sampson (2006) illustrate this aspect well.  
